

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MAMER

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS UNN

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CIA

DIA

JCS

JUSMAAG

WHITE HOUSE

USAJFKCMA/ATCS-WL-DSA

4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC

CINCPAC

CINCPACAF

CINCPACFLT

DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN

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AMEMBASSY KHRAN  
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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MILI, MARR, EGEN, PGOV, PINR, VN

SUBJECT: SAIGON MISSION NORTH VIETNAM BI-WEEKLY NO 29

SUMMARY: THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS REACTED STRONGLY TO THE BEGINNING OF A US AIRLIFT OF FOOD AND FUEL FROM SAIGON TO PHNOM PENH, CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO "PUNISH THIS ACT OF WAR", WHILE ASSERTING THAT THE US IS "INTENSIFYING THE WAR" IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN BOTH THE DRV AND "PRG"-HELD AREAS, MEANWHILE, THERE WERE NUMEROUS SIGNS OF OVERT DISSIDENCE;. #8&#-LEVEL POLICY DIFFERENCES, AND RESULTANT APPEALS FOR DISCIPLINE AND MILITANCE. SEVERAL RECENT STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN RECENT MONTHS, AS WELL AS A VETERANS' REBELLION LAST JULY, INDICATE THAT POST-PARIS AGREE-MENT EXPECTATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET IN NORTH VIETNAM. CAPTURED NVA DESERTERS ARE BEING WORKED IN PUBLIC AS AN EXAMPLE TO POTENTIAL DESERTERS IN ONE DISTRICT IN THE DRV, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT REPATRIATED NORTH VIETNAMESE POW'S ARE RECEIVING BETTER TREATMENT THAN THEIR SOUTHERN BRETHREN, LEADING TO VIOLENCE FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE  
E  
BEING REINDOCTRINATED. THERE IS ALSO A REPORT OF A TOP-LEVEL POLICY DISPUTE WITHIN THE "PRG", PITTING NATIVE SOUTHERNERS FAVORING NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST NORTHERN TRANSPLANTS WHO URGE A QUICK MILITARY PUSH TO TOPPLE THE GVN. THIS DEBATE MAY BE A REFLECTION OF A SIMILAR DEBATE IN HANOI, HINTED AT IN THE REVISED OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE  
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VIETNAM WORKERS' PARTY AND IN A RECENT HANOI EDITORIAL WARNING OF ENEMY ESPIONAGE AND "TRICKS" TO UNDERMINE MORALE IN THE NORTH. IN ADDITION, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT HANOI'S ECONOMIC PLANS ARE SLIPPING AS A RESULT OF WAR REQUIREMENTS. RADIO HANOI HAS IDENTIFIED LE TOAN THU AS AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE FIRST NEW NAME IN 15 YEARS. A PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESS IN NORTH VIETNAME CAST FURTHER DOUBT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS ANYTIME SOON.

IN FOREIGN RELATIONS, A MILITARY DELEGATION FROM THE PRC ARRIVED IN HANOI FEBRUARY 28 AMIDST CONSIDERABLE FANFARE AND PROFESSIONS OF SOLIDARITY AND FRIENDSHIP; THE VISIT MAY BE CONCERNED WITH CHINESE AID TO THE DRV OR CAMBODIA. CAMBODIAN LEADERS PRINCE SIHANOUK AND IENG SARY, WHO HAD VISITED HANOI OVER THE TET HOLIDAYS, LEFT FOR PEKING ON FEBRUARY 15 AND 28 RESPECTIVELY; SIHANOUK SAID IN PEKING LATER THAT THE DRV HAD AGREED TO SPEED UP DELIVERIES OF CHINESE MILITARY AID TO CAMBODIA THROUGH NORTH VIETNAM. DRV MEDIA HAVE CONCLUDED ALREADY THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN BANGKOK IS AS INTRACTABLE AS ITS PREDECESSORS ON US MILITARY PRESENCE.

MEXICAN PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA REPORTEDLY SHOWED INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH HANOI TO VISITING DRV SUPREME COURT PRESIDENT BACH. HANOI CELEBRATED THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIENTIANE AGREEMENT, WITH WARNINGS TO THE LAO OF "MANY OBSTACLES" AHEAD. INDIA FINALLY SET THE PUBLIC RECORD STRAIGHT BY SAYING IT WAS "TAKING STEPS" TOWARD "FORMAL CONTACTS" WITH THE "PRG", IN CONTRAST TO THE LATTER'S CLAIMS TO HAVE ALREADY "ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS". EAST GERMANY, POLAND, AND THE SOVIET LABOR MOVEMENT PROMISED ECONOMIC AID TO THE "PRG; A PALESTINE LABOR GROUP VISITED THE DRV, "PRG", AND COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED CAMBODIA, WHILE A "PRG" STUDENT DELEGATION LEFT TO TOUR SCANDINAVIA. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

A. COMMUNISTS WARN OF "APPROPRIATE MEASURES" IN RESPONSE TO AIRLIFT

1. ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AN AIRLIFT OF FOOD AND FUEL SUPPLIES WOULD BE BEGUN BETWEEN SAIGON AND PHNOM PENH ELICITED STRONG REACTION FROM THE COMMUNISTS. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED FEBRUARY 26, 1975 THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY CHARGED THAT THE AIRLIFT, WHICH IT CONFIDENTIAL

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CLAIMED TRANSPORTED "WEAPONS, MUNITIONS, FUEL AND FOOD", CONSTITUTED "SERIOUS VIOLATION" OF ARTICLES 1, 4, 7 AND 20 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND REFLECTED US INTENT TO USE SOUTH VIET-NAM AS A BASE FOR "AGGRESSION" AGAINST CAMBODIA. THE STATEMENT DEMANDED THE AIRLIFT BE CANCELLED AND WARNED THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS, "CLOSELY UNITING WITH THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE", HAVE THE "FULL RIGHT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES" TO PUNISH THE US AND GVN.

2. A STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE SO-CALLED "PRGRSV" ON FEBRUARY 21 ALSO CHARGED THE US WITH "INTENSIFYING THE WAR" IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. CITING ADMINISTRATION EFFORTS TO SECURE ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID FOR THE RVN, THE ALLEGED INTRODUCTION OF SOME 150,000 TONS OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION INTO THE RVN IN DECEMBER 1974 AND JANUARY 1975, AND THE PRESENCE OF

"HUNDREDS" OF ADDITIONAL USAF PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIET-NAM (BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS' ROSTER OF "DISGUISED" US MILITARY ADVISERS IN THE RVN TO 26,000), THE STATEMENT REITERATED COMMUNIST DEMANDS FOR AN END TO US "MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND INTERFERENCE" IN THE SOUTH AND THE OVERTHROW OF PRESIDENT THIEU AS THE "CORRECT WAY" TO SOLVE THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. END UNCLASSIFIED.

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B. ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT AND DEMONSTRATIONS

1. SOCIAL UNREST AND DISCONTENT WITH THE WAR REPORTEDLY ARE ON THE RISE IN NORTH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO A REPORT WHICH RECENTLY REACHED THE EMBASSY, YOUTHS IN HANOI AND IN THANH HOA AND NINH BINH PROVINCES STAGED DEMONSTRATIONS IN LATE DECEMBER AND EARLY JANUARY TO PRETEST MILITARY CONSCRIPTION, INADEQUATE FOOD AND POOR LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE UNIVERSITIES. THEY ALSO ARE SAID TO HAVE DEMANDED AN END TO THE WAR AND A RELAXATION OF THE CURRENT TIGHT SECURITY CONTROLS OVER STUDENT ACTIVITIES. NORTH VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY RESPONDED BY ARRESTING ONLY THE RINGLEADERS, ALTHOUGH A SERIES OF STREET CLASHES BETWEEN POLICE AND DEMONSTRATORS ARE SAID TO HAVE RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF FOUR STUDENTS AND ONE SECURITY OFFICER.

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AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS UNN

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CIA

DIA

JCS

JUSMAAG

WHITE HOUSE

USAFKCM/ATCS-WL-DSA

4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC

CINCPAC

CINCPACAF

CINCPACFLT

DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN

AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMCONSUL DANANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

KAMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

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2. ACCORDING TO THE SAME REPORT, A GROUP OF DISCHARGED, CRIPPLED VETERANS, MOSTLY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ORIGIN, STAGED AN ARMED REBELLION LAST JULY IN THANH HOA PROVINCEZN SEIZING A PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE. THEY WERE PROTESTING OFFICIAL NEGLECT AND MISTREATMENT. MANY OF THEM REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN UNEMPLOYED AND FORCED TO LIVE IN STOCKADES SINCE THEIR DISCHARGE.

3. ALTHOUGH MORALE AND POPULAR DISCIPLINE IN NORTH VIETNAM HAVE NEVER MEASURED UP TO PROPAGANDISTS' CLAIMS, THESE RECENTLY REPORTED INCIDENTS INDICATE A DEGREE OF UNREST THAT HAS RARELY BEEN NOTED BOFORE. MUCH OF THE CURRENT DISCONTENT IS A DIRECT OUT-GROWTH OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS WHICH LED TO RISING EXPECTATIONS AND EXTRAVAGANT PROMISES FROM THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING PROSPECTS FOR AN IMPROVED STANDARD OF LIVING, NONE OF WHICH HAVE BEEN FULFILLED

.  
DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, MOREOVER, HUNDREDS OF STUDENTS WHO HAD BEEN STUDYING ABROAD DURING THE WAR HAVE BEGUN TO RETURN HOME, BRINGING WITH THEM HABITS AND ATTITUDES THAT DO NOT SIT WELL WITH HANOI(S PURITANICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING A TASTE FOR LONG HAIR, FLARED TROUSERS, AND WESTERN MUSIC, PARTICULARLY ROCK-AND-ROLL AND JAZZ. MANY OF THESE STUDENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN HIGHLY DISAPPOINTED OVER THE REGIME'S FIALURE TO ORGANIZE THE ECONOMY SO AS TO EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE THE SKILLS THEY HAVE ACQUIRED.  
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4. STILL ANOTHER SOURCE OF THE CURRENT UNREST IS THE LARGE NUMBERS OF COMBATE TROOPS AND RELEASED COMMUNIST POWS WHO HAVE RETURNED TO NORTH VIETNAM SINCE T E CEASEFIRE. THESE MILITARY PERSONNEL APPAR-

ENTLY ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY UNRULY AND QUARRELSOME, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY ARE UNDEREMPLOYED BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF POLICIES COVERING THEIR TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION. (SEE PARAS C AND D)  
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#### C. DISCIPLINING DESERTERS

ACCORDING TO A RECENT COMMUNIST RALLIER, THE HANOI LEADERSHIP IS DEVELOPING NEW TACTICS FOR DISCIPLINING AND RETRAINING DESERTERS IN NORTH VIETNAM. BY HIS ACCOUNT, THE REGIME HAS ORGANIZED A "DESERTER'S

COMPANY" IN LUC NGAN DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE, WHICH IS TO SERVE AS A MODEL FOR THE PROJECT. THE FIRST OF ITS KIND, THE LUC NGAN UNIT IS PURPOSELY GARRISONED INSIDE THE DISTRICT TOWN ITSELF SO THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HOW DESERTERS ARE TREATED. THE FIRST-HAND EXPOSURE IS AIMED AT DISCOURAGING DESERTIONS AMONG LOCAL RECRUITS. (UP TO NOW, DESERTERS' UNITS HAVE BEEN STATIONED OUTSIDE POPULATED AREAS.)

2. THE LUC NGAN UNIT IS MADE UP OF 160 PERSONNEL, SIXTY PERCENT OF WHOM ARE DESERTERS FROM UNITS IN NORTH VIETNAM, WITH THE REMAINDER FROM UNITS IN THE SOUTH WHO HAD MADE THEIR WAY HOME PRIOR TO BE CAPTURED.

3. AS PART OF THEIR PUNISHMENT, ALL UNIT MEMBERS ARE REQUIRED TO

WORK EIGHT HOURS A DAY AT HARD LABOR, SIX DAYS A WEEK. THOSE WITH LESS THAN TWO YEARS SERVICE TO THEIR CREDIT ARE REQUIRED TO SPEND TWO YEARS AT HARD LABOR WHILE TWO- OR THREE-YEAR VETERANS MUST DO ONE YEAR AT HARD LABOR.

UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR SENTENCES, THOSE WHO ARE AGED 38 OR OVER, WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR FOUR OR MORE CHILDREN OR WHO ARE "ONLY SONS" ARE DISCHARGED FROM SERVICE IN THE CUSTODY OF AUTHORITIES IN THEIR NATIVE DISTRICTS. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL ARE REASSIGNED TO MILITARY UNITS. CONFIDENTIAL

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ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, THE CREATION OF THE NEW PILOT UNIT IN LUC NGAN IS INDICATIVE OF JUST HOW SERIOUS THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY DESERTIONS HAS BECOME THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.

#### D. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SOUTHERNERS

1. THE REGIME IN NORTH VIETNAM HAS ORGANIZED AN ELABORATE PROGRAM FOR PROCESSING RELEASED POWS THAT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST NATIVE SOUTHERN PERSONNEL, ACCORDING TO A RECENT RALLIER. ALTHOUGH ALL CONVALESCENTS REPORTEDLY ARE ALLOWED TO BORROW MONEY DURING THEIR YEAR OF REINDOCTRINATION, ONLY NATIVE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE ULTIMATELY FORCED TO REPAY. MOREOVER, DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS, SOUTHERNERS ARE PERMITTED ONLY A WEEK'S LEAVE, WHILE NORTHERNERS RECEIVE AT LEAST A MONTH OFF. ONCE THE YEAR OF SCREENING AND INDOCTRINATION IS OVER, NORTHERNERS REPORTEDLY ARE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE VILLAGES IN NORTH VIETNAM WHILE MOST SOUTHERN VETERANS ARE REASSIGNED TO COMBAT UNITS IN THE SOUTH. THIS UNEQUAL TREATMENT, ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, HAS LED TO RIOTS AND PROTESTS BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

2. THE SOURCE DESCRIBES THE REINDOCTRINATION PROGRAM AS A MIXTURE OF ENFORCED POLITICS AND LEISURE. THE RETURNEES SPEND THEIR FIRST THREE MONTHS UNDERGOING CONVALESCENCE AND INITIAL PROCESSING WHILE RECEIVING A HEALTHY FOOD AND MEDICINE ALLOWANCE. DURING THE SECOND THREE MONTHS, THEY ARE SUBJECTED TO DEBRIEFINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS AND ARE ALLOWED TO BORROW MONEY AGAINST THEIR SALARIES TO OFFSET THE REDUCTION IN FOOD AND MEDICAL RATIONS THAT TAKES PLACE AT THIS TIME. (THE SALARIES OF ALL FORMER COMMUNIST POWS WERE RESTORED IN MAY 1973; THERE IS NO RETROACTIVE PAY TO COVER THE PERIOD OF CONFINEMENT.) THE FINAL SIX MONTHS OF THE PROCESSING PROGRAM ARE SPENT LARGELY IN RENEWED CONVALESCENCE.

#### E. POLICY DEBATE

1. RECENT REPORTING FROM COMMUNIST-HELD AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM REVEALS POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES AMONG COMMUNIST LEADERS OVER HOW THEIR AIMS OUGHT TO BE PURSUED. ACCORDING TO A RECENT VISITOR TO PRG TERRITORY, ONE FACTION IS URGING AN END TO THE FIRTING AND NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT SETTING UP A COALITION GOVERNMENT, ALBEIT

TOTALLY ON COMMUNIST TERMS. THIS GROUP REPORTEDLY INCLUDES  
SENIOR "PRG" OFFICIALS--"PRGJZ PRESIDENT HUYNH TAN PHAT, FOREIGN  
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MINISTER NGUYEN THI BINH, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LE QUANG CHANH,  
CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE VAN HA,  
AND CHIEF OF ITS ASIA-PACIFIC DIRECTORATE, NGUYEN VAN DONG.  
ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DEBATE ARE "PRG" DEFENSE MINISTER "TRAN NAM  
TRUNG" AND "PRG ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF" GENERAL TRAN VAN TRA, BOTH OF

WHOM ARGUE THAT IS THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES PUSH QUICKLY THEY  
CAN TOPPLE THE THIEU GOVERNMENT. BOTH TRUNG (REAL NAME TRAN LUONG)  
AND TRA ARE SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE GENERALS MASQUERADING AS "PRG"  
OFFICIALS. TRA IS NOW MILITARY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF COSVN, THE  
COMMUNIST HEADQUARTERS FOR THE SOUTHERN HALF OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

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2. REPORTS OF POLICY DEBATES WITHIN THE COMMUNIST COMMAND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN RIFE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THIS LATEST ACCOUNT MUST BE VIEWED WITH SOME CAUTION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE "PRG" OFFICIALS DELIBERATELY TRIED TO NURTURE THE IMAGE OF AN INDEPENDENT-MINDED "PRG" LEADERSHIP IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE THEIR VISITOR THAT THE NORTH IS NOT RUNNING THE REVOLUTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS OTHER TANGENTIAL EVIDENCE THAT A STRATEGY DEBATE HAS BEEN PERCOLATING WITHIN THE HIGHEST COMMUNIST COMMAND ECHELONS. LAST SEPTEMBER NORTH VIETNAM'S THEORETICAL JOURNAL COMPLAINED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF OFFICIAL POLICY WERE UNDER FIRE, AND IT CRITICIZED EXTREMISTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONTROVERSY, I.E., THOSE WHO OPPOSED AN INCREASED MILITARY COMMITMENT IN THE SOUTH AND THOSE WHO ADVOCATED PUSHING THAT COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY SOLUTION, TO

THE DETRIMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION IN THE NORTH. MORE RECENTLY, PARTY FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN INDICATED IN A MAJOR SPEECH THAT A PURGE OF DISSENT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PARTY WAS NECESSARY. SUCH STRAWS IN THE WIND SEEM COLLECTIVELY TO POINT TO THE KIND OF POLICY DEBATE WHICH THE RECENT VISITOR TO THE "PRG" AREAS DETECTED AMONG THE OFFICIALS HE MET THERE. END CONFIDENTIAL.

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F. PARTY HISTORY UPDATED

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1. ON THE OCCASION OF THE VWP'S 45TH FOUNDING ANNIVERSARY (FEBRUARY 3), THE PARTY'S PUBLISHING ORGAN ISSUED A NEW PARTY HISTORY: "45 YEARS OF ACTIVITIES OF THE VWP" (SEE BI-WEEKLY NO. 28). COMPILED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH ON PARTY HISTORY, THE NEW WORK IS ESSENTIALLY AN UPDATE OF THE DOCUMENT PUBLISHED IN 1970 AND DIFFERS LITTLE FROM THE EARLIER HISTORY IN EITHER ORGANIZATION, CONTENT OR TONE. HOWEVER, WHILE MOST OF THE FEW CHANGES APPARENT IN THE 1975 EDITION ARE IN THE FORM OF FACTUAL ADDITIONS OR CORRECTIONS, THE AUTHORS HAVE OBVIOUSLY DONE SOME EDITING WITH AN EYE TO INCREASING THE DOCUMENT'S RELEVANCE TO CURRENT PROBLEMS.

2. ONE OF THE MOST CURIOUS ADDITIONS TO THE 1975 VERSION REVEALS AN ONGOING ARGUMENT WITHIN THE PARTY OVER THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE "THIRD STAGE" OF THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH BEGAN AND WHAT THAT STAGE SHOULD BE CALLED. ACCORDING TO THE PARTY HISTORY, SOME PEOPLE MAINTAIN THAT THE THIRD STAGE, THE "GENERAL OFFENSIVE", BEGAN IN THE FALL AND WINTER OF 1953 WITH "REPEATED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVES" CULMINATING IN THE "DECISIVE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE" AGAINST DIEN BIEN PHU. OTHERS APPARENTLY ARGUE THAT THE THIRD STAGE, THE "OFFENSIVE, BEGAN IN LATE 1950 WITH A "LIMITED OFFENSIVE" DEVELOPING INTO THE 1953-54 "WINTER-SPRING COMPREHENSIVE OFFENSIVE". THE 1975 HISTORY'S COMMENT THAT THE ISSUE IS "STILL BEING STUDIED", PROVIDES STRONG INDICATION THAT THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS ARE NOT UNRELATED TO CURRENT EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAY, IN FACT, REFLECT CENTRAL ISSUES OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS OVER THE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY PRESENTLY REQUIRED IN THE SOUTH.

3. IN KEEPING WITH STATEMENTS RECENTLY MADE BY VWP FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN (SEE BI-WEEKLY NO. 28), THE 1975 EDITIO OF THE PARTY HISTORY ALSO INCLUDES EXPANDED REFERENCES TO INTERNAL PARTY PROBLEMS, INCLUDING FLAGGING ETHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL STANDARDS AND THE NEED TO INSURE "UNANIMITY" AMONG PARTY MEMBERS. THE NEW DOCUMENT ALSO DEPARTS FROM THE 1970 VERSION BY ADDING THE NAME OF DUONG VAN MINH TO THE VWP'S ROSTER OF AMERICAN "LACKEYS", EQUATING HIM, IF ONLY

BRIEFLY, WITH NGUYEN KHANH AS ONE OF THE AMERICAN-SELECTED SUCCESSORS TO NGO DINH DIEM.

4. IN A NEW SECTION WHICH CARRIES THROUGH THE END OF 1974, THE PARTY HISTORY SKETCHES ITS FAMILIAR VERSION OF EVENTS LEADING UP  
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TO THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND THE OPENING OF A "NEW STAGE" IN THE VIETNAMESE "REVOLUTION". THE HISTORY REFLECTS CONTINUED BITTERNESS OVER DETENTE, CALLING IT A "DECEITFUL AND PERFIDIOUS FOREIGN POLICY," AND IMPLIED THAT THE U.S.'S "MALICIOUS POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS" OF 1971-72 HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR HANOI IN MUSTERING SUPPORT FOR THE 1972 "STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE". THE HISTORY IS CAUTIOUS, BUT POSITIVE, IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH, NOTING THAT "LIBERATED AREAS" NOT ONLY HAVE BEEN "MAINTAINED" AND "CONSOLIDATED", BUT "EXPANDED" AS WELL. THE DOCUMENT ALSO PRAISES THE "IMPORTANT CHANGES" IN THE "URBAN STRUGGLE MOVEMENT" IN THE SOUTH. ALTHOUGH IT HOLDS THAT THIEU HAS BEEN DRIVEN INTO A "COMPREHENSIVE AND PROFOUND CRISIS" IN WHICH HIS RESIGNATION IS BEING DEMANDED BY THE POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN THE SOUTH, THE HISTORY MAKES SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO NEITHER THE COMMUNISTS' OCTOBER 8, 1974, STATEMENT NOR TO THEIR REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH THIEU. THE ABSENCE OF A DIRECT CALL FOR THIEU'S OVERTHROW PERHAPS INDICATES THAT HANOI IS KEEPING ITS LONG-RANGE OPTIONS OPEN.

5. NOR DOES THE 1975 PARTY HISTORY MENTION THE UPCOMING (1976-1980) FIVE-YEAR PLAN. INSTEAD, THE DOCUMENT NOTES THAT THE "VERY FIERCE" NATURE OF THE "NATIONAL AND CLASS STRUGGLES" IN THE SOUTH HAVE A CONSTANT EFFECT ON THE NORTH AND CALLS FOR A CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN 1976 SUFFICIENT TO INSURE "ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF AID TO THE SOUTHERN REVOLUTION." THE HISTORY CITES THE NEED TO "TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PEACETIME" IN ORDER TO COMPLETE ECONOMIC REHABILITATION AND TO PREPARE FOR "LONG-TERM" ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT." (SEE ITEM H. BELOW.)

G. DRV PAPER CALLS FOR INCREASED "POLITICAL SECURITY"

1. "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN", THE VPA DAILY, ON FEBRUARY 25 CARRIED AN ARTICLE CALLING ON PEOPLE IN NORTH VIET-NAM'S CITIES TO "HEIGHTEN POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS" IN ORDER TO PROTECT "POLITICAL SECURITY", COUNTER ENEMY ESPIONAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORTS, AND "SUPPRESS REACTIONARIES WHO ARE OPPOSING OUR REGIME IN ANY FORM AND ON ANY SCALE." THE STRONGEST STATEMENT ON THE THE SUBJECT IN RECENT MONTHS, THE "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN"

ARTICLE ACCUSED THE U.S. AND THE RVN OF "PLOTING TO INFILTRATE" AGENTS INTO THE NORTH'S URBAN AREAS FOR PURPOSES OF SABOTAGE "IN  
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THE IMMEDIATE AND DISTANT FUTURE". THE PAPER ALSO CONDEMNED WHAT IT DESCRIBED AS "ALL KINDS OF TRICKS" TO UNDERMINE POPULAR MORALE, DAMPEN THE "FIGHTING SPIRIT" OF THE PEOPLE, AND INCITE DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY. "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN" ALSO REVEALED OFFICIAL SENSITIVITY OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORTS TO "DISTORT THE SITUATION" IN THE DRV AND "CONFUSE INEXPERIENCED AND CREDULOUS PEOPLE."

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3276

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CIA

DIA

JCS

JUSMAAG

WHITE HOUSE

USAJFKCMA/ATCS-WL-DSA  
4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC  
CINCPAC  
CINCPACAF  
CINCPACFLT  
DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN  
AMCONSUL BIEN HOA  
AMCONSUL CAN THO  
AMCONSUL DANANG  
AMCONSUL NHA TRANG  
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AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
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2. ALTHOUGH WARNINGS AGAINST ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN FAIRLY COMMON IN NORTH VIETNAMESE MEDIA OVER THE YEARS, THE "QUAND DOI NHAN DAN" ARTICLE FOLLOWS INDICATIONS OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICY DIFFERENCES AMONG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP AND MAY HAVE BEEN KEYED TO PROBLEMS ARISING FROM SUCH DIFFERENCES. ACCORDING TO AFP'S HANOI CORRESPONDENT, UNIDENTIFIED "OBSERVERS" IN NORTH VIET-NAM HAVE OPINED THAT THE "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN" ARTICLE REFLECTS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN "ARCH-CONSERVATIVE" AND "LIBERAL AND REFORMING" FACTIONS WITHIN THE PARTY AND STATE APPARATUS. WHILE AFP'S "OBSERVERS" APPARENTLY SEE SUCH DIFFERENCES AS LARGELY CONCERNED WITH DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR HANOI'S POLICY IN THE SOUTH.  
END UNCLASSIFIED - BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

H. DELAY IN 5-YEAR ECONOMIC PLANNING

NORTH VIETNAMESE TRADE OFFICIALS IN HANOI HAVE INDICATED TO A RECENT VISITOR THAT THE REGIME'S PROGRAM OF BASIC RECONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO THE END OF 1976 BECAUSE OF POOR INITIAL RESULTS. OVER A YEAR AGO, HANOI ANNOUNCED THAT THE PROGRAM WOULD BE SUPERSEDED IN EARLY 1976 BY A FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN LOOKING

BEYOND BASIC RECONSTRUCTION TO ELABORATE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

THE REGIME'S MORE RECENT DECISION TO PROLONG THE RECONSTRUCTION  
PHASE SUGGESTS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN ALSO WILL  
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BE DELAYED. ONE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL TOLD THE VISITOR FLATLY  
THAT THE NORTH HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MEET ITS DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES  
BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING COMMUNIST MILITARY EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.  
THESE REMARKS IMPLY A GROWING AWARENESS WITHIN THE HANOI LEADERSHIP  
THAT THE PROGRAM OF "HARMONIZED" ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRIORITIES  
ARTICULATED IN PARTY JOURNALS LAST FALL IS NOT WORKING AND THAT  
THE WAR CONTINUES TO MAKE DISPROPORTIONATE DEMANDS ON THE COUNTRY'S  
MEAGER RESOURCE BASE. END CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

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#### I. NEW ALTERNATIVE MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE IDENTIFIED

1. IN COVERAGE OF A NOSTALGIC TET VISIT MADE BY VWP POLIT-  
BURO MEMBER TRUONG CHINH TO THE FAMILIES OF 'FORMER BASIC-LEVEL  
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY WORKERS' IN A VILLAGE THAT HAD APPARENTLY  
SERVED AS A CLANDESTINE PARTY HEADQUARTERS IN THE 1941-42 PERIOD,  
RADIO HANOI IDENTIFIED ONE OF CHINH'S COMPANIONS, LE TOAN THU,  
AS AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

2. FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS ONE OF THE PARTY CADRES OPERATING IN  
THE AREA WITH TRUONG CHINH AND CURRENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER  
HOANG QUOC VIET AND ALTERNATE LE QUANG DAO, THU IS THE FIRST  
IDENTIFIED ADDITION TO THE RANKS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE ALTERNATES  
SINCE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS ELECTED AT THE 3RD VWP CONGRESS IN  
1960. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON HIS BACKGROUND.

#### J. PROVINCIAL PARTY GROUP MEETS

CAO BANG PROVINCE HELD ITS 8TH PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESS IN LATE  
1974 OR THE FIRST DAYS OF 1975. APPARENTLY THE FIRST SUCH MEETING  
IN FOUR YEARS, THE CONGRESS WAS ADDRESSED BY VWP SECRETARY NGUYEN  
VAN TRAN. 'NHAN DAN' COVERAGE OF THE CONGRESS (JANUARY 6) PROVIDED  
NO INDICATION THAT DELEGATES WERE ELECTED TO A NATIONAL CONGRESS, A  
NECESSARY PRELIMINARY STEP IF A 4TH NATIONAL VWP CONGRESS IS TO BE  
HELD. ALTHOUGH HARDLY CONCLUSIVE, THE FAILURE OF THE CAO BANG CON-  
GRESS TO ELECT DELEGATES PROVIDES A LEAST A STRONG INDICATION THAT  
A NATIONAL CONGRESS IS NOT NOW BEING PLANNED FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL  
MONTHS.

K. CHINESE PLA DELEGATION ARRIVES IN HANOI  
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1. A PRC MILITARY DELEGATION ARRIVED IN HANOI FEBRUARY 28. THE DELEGATION, LED BY CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER AND COMMANDER OF THE SINKIANG PLA UNITS YANG YUNG, WAS MET AT GIA LAM AIRPORT BY A FLOCK OF VPA GENERAL OFFICERS, INCLUDING VWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, VICE-MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE VPA GENERAL STAFF COLONEL GENERAL HOANG VAN THAI. ALSO AMONG THE GREETERS WAS LIEUTENANT GENERAL TRAN SAM (ALSO A VICE-MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF), WHO IN THE PAST HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN INVOLVED IN MILITARY AID NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI'S PATRONS.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE PLA DELEGATION'S PRESENCE IN HANOI IS NOT KNOWN. RADIO HANOI DESCRIBED IT AS A 'FRIENDLY VISIT' AND HOANG VAN THAI, SPEAKING AT A FEBRUARY 28 'GRAND RECEPTION' FOR THE CHINESE HOSTED BY VWP POLITBURO MEMBER VO NGUYEN GIAP, CALLED THE VISIT A 'BRILLIANT DEMONSTRATION' OF DRV/PRC 'MILITANT SOLIDARITY AND WARM FRIENDSHIP.' IN WHAT MAY REFLECT AT LEAST PART OF THE MOTIVATION FOR THE VISIT, A 'QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL OF MARCH 1, IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERALLY EFFUSIVE WELCOME TO THE CHINESE, SPOKE OF CHINA'S 'GREAT SUPPORT AND VALUABLE, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN MANY DOMAINS.'

L. SIHANOUK AND IENG SANG LEAVE HANOI SEPARATELY

1. CAMBODIAN PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK, WHO ARRIVED IN HANOI FEBRUARY 9 (SEE BI-WEEKLY NO. 28), DEPARTED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CAPITAL FEBRUARY 15. PUBLIC COVERAGE OF SIHANOUK'S VISIT WAS LARGELY LIMITED TO ACCOUNTS OF TRIPS TO MUSEUMS, TEMPLES, FLOWER MARKETS AND OTHER TET-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND PROVIDED LITTLE HINT OF ANY SUBSTANTIVE MOTIVATION FOR THE FORMER CAMBODIAN LEADER'S PRESENCE IN HANOI. FEBRUARY 11 SIHANOUK AND HIS ENTOURAGE ATTENDED A "GRAND RECEPTION" GIVEN FOR THEM BY DRV PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG. IN A WELCOMING SPEECH, DONG PRAISED THE RECENT "BRILLIANT EXPLOITS" OF THE KHMER INSURGENTS AND PLEDGED HANOI'S RESOLUTE SUPPORT OF THE REBELS. DONG ALSO REFERRED TO "A NEW, VERY FINE STEP" HAVING BEEN REACHED IN DRV-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS "IN THE PAST YEAR", BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

2. A FEBRUARY 24 AFP INTERVIEW WITH SIHANOUK IN PEKING INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DRV HAD AGREED DURING HIS VISIT TO "RESPOND TO AN CONFIDENTIAL

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AMERICAN AIRLIFT TO PHNOM PENH BY STEPPING UP OVERLAND DELIVERIES OF CHINESE ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO CAMBODIA THROUGH NORTH VIETNAM." AFP IN HANOI SAID FEBRUARY 28 THAT "NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS TODAY GAVE IMPLIED CONFIRMATION" OF THE STORY.

3. IENG SARY, SPECIAL ADVISER OF THE RGNVC VICE-PRIMIER'S OFFICE,  
WHO HAD ARRIVED IN HANOI FEBRUARY 10, WAS RECEIVED BY PHAM VAN DONG  
FEBRUARY 13. HANOI MEDIA PROVIDED NO INDICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE  
OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS. IN ITS ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR  
PEKING ON FEBRUARY 28, VNA REPORTED THAT IENG SARY HAD HAD "CORDIAL  
MEETINGS" WITH GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP, THE VIETNAM FATHERLAND  
FRONT'S HOANG QUOC VIET, AND RESIDENT "P  
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ACTION EA-10

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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
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AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
USDEL JEC PARIS  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USLO PEKING  
CIA  
DIA  
JCS  
JUSMAAG  
WHITE HOUSE  
USAFKCM/ATCS-WL-DSA  
4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC  
CINCPAC  
CINCPACAF  
CINCPACFLT  
DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN  
AMCONSUL BIEN HOA  
AMCONSUL CAN THO  
AMCONSUL DANANG  
AMCONSUL NHA TRANG  
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M. DRV MEDIA CONDEMNS NEW THAI GOVERNMENT

THE NEW THAI GOVERNMENT OF PRIMIN SENI PRAMOJ HAS APPARENTLY FAILED TO MEET HANOI'S STANDARDS. RADIO HANOI AND "NHAN DAN" WERE CRITICAL OF THE INITIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF SENI AND HIS DEFENSE MINISTER, AND SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARIES BY RADIO HANOI AND "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN" SAW "NO CHANGE" IN THE RTG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE DRV, NOTABLY THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN THAILAND (SAIGON 2009 - NOTAL). "QUAN DOI NHAN DAN" CONCLUDED THAT THE NEW RTG IS "ONLY INVITING STRONG RESISTANCE FROM THE THAI PEOPLE AND THE INDIGNANT CONDEMNATION OF ALL INDOCHINESE PEOPLES." WHILE THE HANOI GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET ISSUED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT, THESE PRESS COMMENTS WOULD SEEM TO LAY TO REST DRV FONMIN TRINH'S MORE CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO BILATERAL ISSUES AT THE TIME OF THE THAI ELECTION LAST MONTH (NORTH VIETNAM BI-WEEKLY NO. 28). END CONFIDENTIAL

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N. DRV SUPREME COURT HEAD VISITS MEXICO

PHAM VAN BACH, PRESIDENT OF THE DRV PEOPLE'S SUPREME COURT, WAS REPORTED IN MEXICO TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE "INVESTIGATING THE CRIMES  
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OF THE CHILEAN FASCISTS", DURING WHICH HE MET MEXICAN PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AND FONMIN RABASA. ACCORDING TO RADIO HANOI, ECHEVERRIA "EXPRESSED INTEREST" IN ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM.

O. DRV SALUTES LAO ANNIVERSARY

HANOI GREETED THE 2ND ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE VIENTIANE AGREEMENT (FEBRUARY 21) WITH PRAISE FOR THE WORK OF THE PGNU AND LAUDED THE STRENGTHENING OF "FRIENDLY COOPERATION" BETWEEN LAOS AND "NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. A FEBRUARY 21 "NHAN DAN" EDITORIAL, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH FAVORABLE CONDITIONS EXIST FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL ACCORD IN LAOS, FUTURE ADVANCES WILL ENCOUNTER "MANY OBSTACLES". THE EDITORIAL BRANDED THE U.S. THE "ENEMY OF PEACE" IN LAOS AND CHARGED THAT THE U.S. IS CONTINUING ITS "INVOLVEMENT" IN LAOS BY MEANS OF "SECRET" MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS AND SUPPORT FOR "ULTRA-RIGHTIST REACTIONARIES".

P. "PRG"/INDIA RELATIONS STILL UNDETERMINED

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM NEW DELHI, THE INDIAN PRESIDENT TOLD PARLIAMENT FEBRUARY 17 THAT THE GOI IS STILL "TAKING STEPS TO ESTABLISH FORMAL CONTACTS AND MORE DIRECT RELATIONS" WITH THE "PRG", GIVING THE LIE TO EARLIER VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST CONTENTIONS THAT "DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS" HAVE BEEN "ESTABLISHED". (SEE NORTH VIETNAM BI-WEEKLIES NOS. 27 AND 28.) THE SEMI-OFFICIAL PRESS TRUST OF INDIA REPORTED ON FEBRUARY 17 THAT DISCUSSIONS "ARE STILL CONTINUING TO FIND MUTUALLY AGREED METHODS TO ESTABLISH FORMAL CONTACTS."

Q. "PRG" AID AND TRAVELERS

EAST GERMANY AND POLAND HAVE SIGNED GRANT AID AGREEMENTS FOR 1975 WITH THE "PRG", ACCORDING TO HANOI'S VNA. A "PROTOCOL ON GOODS SUPPLY" PROMISING MEDICINES, SCHOOL MATERIALS, INSECTICIDES, ETC., WAS SIGNED IN BERLIN ON FEBRUARY 14, AND AN ECONOMIC AID AGREEMENT FOR 1975 WAS SIGNED IN WARSAW ON FEBRUARY 15. ALSO, THE USSR ALL-UNION CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD SEND ITS COUNTERPART IN THE "LIBERATED ZONE" GIFTS WORTH 500,000 RUBLES (US\$600,000); THE GIFTS WERE TO INCLUDE "VARIOUS MEANS OF TRANSPORT, CLOTH, MEDICINES, ETC." A DELEGATION FROM THE PALESTINE WORKERS UNION REPORTEDLY EXPECTED TO VISIT THE DRV AND "SOME OF THE LIBERATED AREAS IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA" IN LATE  
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FEBRUARY. MEANWHILE, A "SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION STUDENT ASSOCIATION" DELEGATION LEFT FOR "FRIENDSHIP VISITS" TO NORWAY, SWEDEN, FINLAND AND ICELAND, ACCORDING TO LIBERATION RADIO FEBRUARY 14.  
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05 JUL 2006

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